Strong intentionalism about emotions, on the other hand, denies the existence of any non-intentional phenomenal residue in emotions. The first version of strong intentionalism about emotions developed in this field were conceptual: emotions were identified with evaluative beliefs or judgements (Solomon 1980, 1988; Neu 2000; Nussbaum 2001). Indeed, the very “positivity” of positively valenced emotions may well be nothing else than the goodness of emotional acts. A bodily feeling or sensation, the feeling from the inside of the condition of one’s body, is intentional in the sense that the feeling is directed towards an object, one’s body, as being a certain way or as undergoing certain changes. Since these objections parallel well-known discussions about the differences between perceptual states and conceptual states (see subproject B), it is no surprise that philosophers of emotions have on their basis tried to model emotions on perception. Can this idea of “hedonic perspective” be spelled out in more details? At first sight, they are typical qualia (intrinsic non-intentional properties of experience) that “colour” the experience without being represented by it: those “accompanying feelings” (Brentano 1995) have been dubbed hedonic tones (Broad 1930: 230). Since medieval philosophers agree that emotions (passions of the soul) are essentially movements of the appetitive powers, the intentionality of emotions is part of the broader problem of the intentionality of our appetitive acts. the property of being the object of a given second-order pro-attitude. Since medieval philosophers agree that emotions (passions of the soul) are essentially movements of the appetitive powers, the intentionality of emotions is part of the broader problem of the intentionality of our appetitive acts. We thus expect to have three papers published and three submitted by mid 2011. That is, the hedonic valence of emotions appears to be what grounds their being liked or disliked, desired or averted. For all these reasons, it is now widely recognized that strong intentionalism about emotions should not be cashed out in terms of doxastic states. Pleasantness may be a perfectly objective, attitude-independent but yet subject-dependent value. Replacing the hedonic tones by hedonic values yield another version of weak intentionalism about emotions: hedonic valence is still a non-intentional property, values being un-intentional. A given situation involving a beloved (or a person one hates) may exemplify a specific disvalue or value for the lover (the hater), but not for the indifferent person. Connexion. Strong intentionalism about emotions, the transparency problem: hedonic modes of presentation to the rescue? Such a claim raises important issues in value theory. As as result, one is for instance led to claim that  “x has a negative value = S dislikes/takes displeasure in x”. According to the perspectival view of value we intend to develop, values have indeed a motivational impact, and are indeed fully real, but there are far less external or worldly that the naïve axiological realist would have it. The sense in which pleasantness could be a personal, or an “agent-relative” value has to be clarified (Ronnow-Rasmussen 2007). Weak intentionalism about emotions: hedonic values to the rescue? Emotions being essentially positive or negative, always matter to us, and therefore, different from many perceptions, they move us in distinctive ways. But such an answer is not open to that view. One hypothesis we plan to evaluate is the idea that appealing to the concept of perspectival facts coming from metaphysics (see subproject A) may shed light on the way we should solve these problems. If pleasantness is an axiological property of emotional acts it may become difficult to explain why that Paul’s own pleasure matter to him more than Julie’s one. It may indeed be argued that even though this relation is contingent from a natural point of view, it is nevertheless normatively necessary (see Fine 2005c, on the notion of normative necessity). The contribution discusses these and similar questions, while special attention is given to authors such as Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, (Ps-)Thomas of Bailly, Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini. In close collaboration with subproject A, we plan to further investigate this process of elision of the subject in perspectival thought. Firstly, as it stands, the proposal entails anti-realism about hedonic valence: the pleasantness or unpleasantness of an emotion is not only extrinsic to it, but depends on the attitude we have toward it. Deonna & Teroni (2008, in press) Mulligan (2008a, 2008b), Teroni (2007), Deonna (2006) Massin (PhD) relate to the metaphysics of emotions: their intentional nature and their relation to values, and their valence. Following Crane (1998), one can call weak intentionalism about emotions the view that emotions have some non-intentional properties beside their intentional ones. Recent philosophers have been led to strong intentionalism about emotions via two different routes. For instance, for an emotion to be pleasant would be for it to be desired (Sidgwick 1981; Brandt 1979; Edwards 1979; Parfit 1984; Heathwood 2007) or liked (Hall 1989). This appeal to perspectival values may therefore be a promising way to address the value problem raised against strong intentionalism about emotions: while strong intentionalism about emotions does entail realism about values (the thesis that values exist independently of our attitude toward them), it does not entail the strong view that values are monadic intrinsic properties of external objects, deprived of any dependence on the subject. In other words, the correct explanation of the alleged fact that all pleasures are conscious may refer to the essence of consciousness rather than to the essence of pleasure. (This is one of the three subprojects of the Sinergia network : Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental Metaphysical Perspectives on Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, which is to start from march 2010). The reason is that by contrast with perceptions, emotions seem to be essentially pleasant or unpleasant. There is in this respect an interesting analogy with sight, to be further explored in subproject A. The fact is especially clear in the case of danger. Rather, what makes that suffering good for me is its occurrence and my hatred for my enemy. The relation between the object’s value and the emotion’s valence could therefore be normative. Here the value is relativised to a species or type of things. We plan thus to be able to publish six articles on the temporal metaphysics of emotions during the duration of the project. To put it another way, emotions would not be mere neutral presentations of values, but presentations of values under a hedonic mode of presentation. 2. One problem with it is that it is not clear how it “feels”. This might be usefully applied to axiological properties, in order to formulate a perspectival account of the so-called personal values, the value “for me”. If so, it seems that strong intentionalism about emotions errs in simply equating them with cognitions of values: it has to tell a further story about their hedonic valence. A further potential worry is that on this view the relation between the valence of the emotion and the value of its object is too loose. I. Indeed, what makes values queer according to Mackie, is that there are both external and prescriptive. It seems indeed possible to fear a spider while judging it perfectly inoffensive, but the theory would imply that the subject makes incompatible judgments. Though deeply incompatible, both views of emotions heavily rely on the notion of perspectival values that is at the core of the second-part of this subproject. (i) Contemporary debates with regard to the existence of phenomenal non-intentional properties originated in the study of perception (Harman, 1990, Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995;  Lycan, 1996; see Byrne, 2001 for a state-of-the-art article and a defense of strong intentionalism about perception). As the contemporary revival of Jamesian theories of emotions (James 1952; Prinz 2004) testifies, a fundamental feature of emotions consists in their specific bodily profiles. subproject B, section III). But what is required in order to “emote” a value is a hedonic perspective on it. Second, the notion of a perspectival formal object of emotions (i.e. Thirdly, many values appear to depend on the observer: the axiological properties of being dangerous, shameful, or attractive do not, pace Moore, supervene on the intrinsic properties of their bearers: the same situation can be dangerous for John but not for Mike. The price to pay, however, is that the valence of the emotion (understood as hedonic qualia) and the value of its object appears as a result to be quite independent from one another: it appears to be contingent that that we take pleasure in valuable facts, and displeasure in disvaluable facts. Those values, therefore, appear to violate the Moorean thesis (Moore 1903) that values always supervene on the intrinsic properties of their bearers. Project leaders: Dr. Julien Deonna, Dr. Fabrice TeroniOlivier Massin, scientific collaborator (postdoc)NN, PhD stude. Now if the hedonic valence of emotions is not intentional, then the incorrectness of having a positive emotion towards a negative fact (e.g. Pleasure would be necessarily conscious not because it is what it is, but because consciousness is what it is.